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The Nationalization of Confucianism: 
Academism, Examinations, and Bureaucratic 
Governance in the Late Tokugawa State
Abstract: This article examines the causes and effects of the shogunate’s estab-
lishment of a state academy and examination system from 1788 onward. It con-
centrates on the role of state academicians in reforming Tokugawa processes 
of governance, suggesting that they effected the creation of a new structural 
engagement between knowledge and power which had surprisingly “modern” 
characteristics. Countering arguments that Neo-Confucian political thought 
encouraged social stasis and authoritarianism in early modern East Asia, I ar-
gue that reforms advanced by Confucians in the late Tokugawa state were usu-
ally designed to open government structures to bottom-up input in an attempt 
to make government more socially responsive.
In 1798 the Tokugawa shogunate nationalized the Hayashi Confucian Acad-
emy in Edo, renaming it the Sho¯heizaka Academy (Sho¯heizaka Gakumonjo) 
and bringing it directly under the control of the government.1 Matsudaira 
Thanks to Benjamin Elman, Peter Flueckiger, Barend ter Haar, Koichiro Matsuda, and Timon 
Screech for early comment and discussion. Special thanks to Ronald Toby, Luke Roberts, and 
the anonymous JJS reviewers for close reading and detailed criticism of the article.
1. I use the word “nationalization” here to denote state takeover of a formerly private 
institution. This is the word’s standard meaning, as seen, for instance, in relation to the “na-
tionalization of banks” carried out in most developed countries during the recent fi nancial 
crisis. This has no relation to the more specialized academic usage of the nouns “nation” 
and “nationalism” in theoretical discussions on political modernity in works such as Ernest 
Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983), and Benedict 
Anderson, Imagined Communities: Refl ections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism 
(London: Verso, 1983). The year of establishment of the Sho¯heizaka Gakumonjo is often 
given as 1797 because establishment occurred in the lunar year Kansei 9, most of which fell 
in the Gregorian 1797. But the establishment occurred in the fi nal month of Kansei 9, which 
fell in early 1798. See Paul Yachita Tsuchihashi, Japanese Chronological Tables: From 601 
to 1872 A.D. (Tokyo: Sophia University Press, 1952), p. 110.
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Sadanobu had laid the groundwork for this action during the Kansei re-
forms. Directly on coming to power, he appointed a range of new Confucian 
teachers to the academy from outside Edo. These appointees, in particular 
the so-called “Three Kansei Professors”—Shibano Ritsuzan (1736–1807), 
Bito¯ Jishu¯ (1747–1813), and Koga Seiri (1750–1817)—had developed in pri-
vate academies in Osaka and Kyoto, and tested in the regional states (han), 
a range of new ideas to reform the bureaucratic functions and mechanisms 
of government. Matsudaira asserted state control over the academy by put-
ting it under the control of these new scholars and facilitated the academy’s 
ability to infl uence government through establishing an examination sys-
tem that infl uenced appointments in the growing bureaucracy of the central 
state.
While the period of the Tokugawa shogunate is often considered the 
high point of Confucianism in Japan, it was not until the 1790s that the cen-
tral state directly integrated Confucianism into the bureaucratic apparatus 
of government or used a Confucian-based examination system in bureau-
cratic appointments. This decision was motivated in part by an increasing 
awareness of Western imperial expansion and a desire to create a ruling 
bureaucracy capable of dealing with this and other challenges. The nation-
alization of Confucianism was therefore closely linked to the attempt to 
create a partly professionalized and meritocratic bureaucracy in order to 
strengthen state administrative systems in the face of international change 
and increasing internal fi nancial complexity.
In this article I analyze reforms to the machinery of shogunate gover-
nance led by the Sho¯heizaka Academy. I examine how Sho¯heizaka Academy 
scholars affected the development in the shogunal state of: (1) a more system-
atically bureaucratic, professionalized approach to government; (2) an insti-
tutionalized position for the academy where it affected the appointment of 
bureaucrats through the installation of an examination system; and (3) a new, 
more aggressive approach to the international situation which sought to in-
crease the acquisition and deployment of specialist knowledge. I also inquire 
into the sources of these policies and innovations, thereby demonstrating 
the extent to which both Sho¯heizaka Academy scholars and their political 
programs were infl uenced by contemporary East Asian political thought, 
particularly that of Qing China. I link the Sho¯heizaka Academy nationaliza-
tion to three major themes of late Tokugawa shogunal government reform: 
bureaucratization, intellectualization (state academism and examinations), 
and internationalization.
The main historical signifi cance of this reform was that it sought to 
increase central state power and to open decision-making processes to a 
broader array of people, allowing bottom-up input into governance. In other 
words, it shows how increasing state power in an early modern feudal con-
text, rather than simply increasing authoritarianism, can also be seen as an 
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attempt to generate more socially engaged, inclusive, and responsive gover-
nance. It reveals that reforms designed to increase centralization and state 
power should not necessarily be interpreted as attempts to strengthen top-
down power, or institute authoritarianism, but can instead be seen as means 
of effecting bottom-up input into governance.
In the conclusion, I link this investigation to recent research by scholars 
who have thought about the historical signifi cance of the tension between 
bureaucratic and feudal forms of governance in the political development of 
Vietnam, China, Korea, and Japan.2 I also locate its signifi cance in relation 
to recent scholarship on the role of orthodoxy in Confucian thought and 
consider the signifi cance of Confucian thought in late early modern gov-
ernance and modernization, as discussed by scholars including Benjamin 
Elman, Kwang-Ching Liu, and William Theodore de Bary.3
English-language scholarship has paid scant attention to the contri-
bution of Tokugawa Neo-Confucianism in the development of the later 
sho gunal state.4 Although the Kansei reforms (Kansei kaikaku) and the 
so-called Kansei Prohibition of Heterodoxy (Kansei igaku no kin) are com-
monly mentioned in the secondary literature, they tend to be presented pri-
marily as a reactionary movement that sought to limit freedom of thought 
and the development of new ideas.5 This has led to the Kansei reforms being 
seen as a conservative reaction rather than a positive reform attempt. One 
2. See, for example, Alexander Woodside, Lost Modernities: China, Vietnam, Korea, 
and the Hazards of World History (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2006), and 
Zhang Xiang and Sonoda Hidehiro, eds., “Ho¯ken” “gunken” saiko¯: Higashi Ajia shakai 
taiseiron no shinso¯ (Kyoto: Shibunkaku Shuppan, 2006).
3. Benjamin A. Elman and Alexander Woodside, eds., Education and Society in Late 
Imperial China, 1600–1900 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994); Kwang-Ching 
Liu, Orthodoxy in Late Imperial China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990); and 
William Theodore de Bary, Neo-Confucian Orthodoxy and the Learning of the Mind-and-
Heart (New York: Columbia University Press, 1981).
4. I use the term “Neo-Confucian” in this article following English-language scholarly 
convention on Tokugawa Japan to refer to the so-called Zhu Xi-ist (shushigaku) tendency 
in Japanese Confucianism. The word “Neo-Confucianism” in English-language scholarship 
needs to be treated carefully, as for some scholars of Chinese Confucianism it can refer to a 
wider range of scholarship—including Wang Yangming, other Ming critics of Zhu Xi, and 
sometimes even extending to any Confucians after the Song period.
5. See, for instance, Tsuji Tatsuya, “Politics in the Eighteenth Century,” in John Whit-
ney Hall, ed., The Cambridge History of Japan, Vol. 4: Early Modern Japan (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 468–70, on the Kansei igaku no kin. This mentions 
the introduction of examination systems positively but is typical for its overriding emphasis 
on the reforms as a limitation on freedom and attempt to establish shogunate ideological 
control. One wonders if the preponderance of this particular approach, particularly in U.S. 
literature, might be related to the enduring infl uence of John W. Hall’s at times almost hagio-
graphic work, Tanuma Okitsugu: Forerunner of Modern Japan (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 1955).
28 Journal of Japanese Studies 38:1 (2012)
of the few intellectual histories to nuance this position was Herman Ooms’s 
fi rst book, Charismatic Bureaucrat: A Political Biography of Matsudaira 
Sadanobu 1758–1829. Ooms painted a more balanced picture of the Kansei 
reforms and also of the Sho¯heizaka scholars’ aims and roles in the establish-
ment of a Neo-Confucian orthodoxy at the academy.6 Even Ooms, however, 
ultimately described the intellectual movement of the Kansei reforms as 
inherently conservative, claiming that, “Neo-Confucianism was primarily 
a convenient ideology . . . to assure political integration without altering 
established institutions” and that “Sadanobu never seriously questioned the 
adequacy of the political system.”7
Other than Ooms’s book, the only major study of the political ideas 
of the Sho¯heizaka scholars in English is a series of articles by Robert L. 
Backus. These articles also tend to hold to the anti-Neo-Confucian line 
common in postwar U.S. scholarship on Japanese intellectual history.8 This 
line, telegraphed from G. W. F. Hegel and Max Weber through Maru yama 
Masao’s wartime writings of the 1940s into the mainstream of postwar 
U.S. scholarship through translation in 1974, presented late Tokugawa Neo-
Confucian thinkers and their conception of orthodoxy as being necessarily 
synonymous with social stasis.9 I argue to the contrary, that institutional 
6. Herman Ooms, Charismatic Bureaucrat: A Political Biography of Matsudaira Sa-
danobu 1758–1829 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1975), pp. 122–50.
7. Ibid., p. 133.
8. Robert L. Backus, “The Kansei Prohibition of Heterodoxy and Its Effects on Educa-
tion,” Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies, Vol. 39 (1979), pp. 55–106; Backus, “The Moti-
vation of Confucian Orthodoxy in Tokugawa Japan,” Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies, 
Vol. 39 (1979), pp. 275–338; Backus, “The Relationship of Confucianism to the Tokugawa 
Bakufu as Revealed in the Kansei Educational Reform,” Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies, 
Vol. 34 (1974), pp. 97–162.
9. Maruyama, Studies in the Intellectual History of Tokugawa Japan, pp. 1–6. The rel-
evant quotes from Hegel can be found in Maruyama’s text. For Weber, see Max Weber, The 
Religion of China: Confucianism and Taoism (New York: Free Press, 1951), pp. 164–67. 
Note that Maruyama’s later work on these issues is much more nuanced and needs to be 
read as a major contribution to the revision of the second generation. See Maruyama Masao, 
Maruyama Masao ko¯giroku (Tokyo: To¯kyo¯ Daigaku Shuppankai, 1998–2000), and the com-
ments of Kurozumi Makoto in Kinsei Nihon shakai to jukyo¯ (Tokyo: Perikansha, 2003), 
p. 27. The only signifi cant references to the early Sho¯heizaka Academy professors Koga Seiri, 
Shibano Ritsuzan, and Bito¯ Jishu¯ in English other than by Backus and Ooms occurred in Ma-
ruyama, Studies in the Intellectual History of Tokugawa Japan, pp. 344–45; Tetsuo Najita, 
Visions of Virtue in Tokugawa Japan: The Kaitokudo¯ Merchant Academy of Osaka (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1987), pp. 182–85; and Timon Screech, The Shogun’s Painted 
Culture: Fear and Creativity in the Japanese States, 1760–1829 (London: Reaktion, 2000), 
pp. 98–99, 258–59. In all three, neither Koga, Shibano, Bito¯, nor Sho¯heizaka Confucianism 
was the main object of study. Screech has provided fascinating insights into the contemporary 
public imagination of Shibano Ritsuzan which fi t with his role in advancing the study of new 
(including Western) ideas and technology by showing how he was artistically represented 
in relation to symbols of mathematics, technology, and time. Screech’s book invites further 
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change was a core part of the Kansei reform agenda and that the Sho¯heizaka 
played a major role in that change through reforming appointment and orga-
nizational systems within the bureaucracy.
Maruyama Masao’s early work during and immediately after World 
War II represented the fi rst generation in an ongoing postwar dialogue 
in Japanese scholarship over the political valence and roles of Neo-
 Confucianism in Japanese history. In the 1970s and 1980s, research from the 
second postwar generation of Japanese-language scholarship in this fi eld, 
comprising the works of Watanabe Hiroshi, Kurozumi Makoto, Kojima Ya-
sunori, Maeda Tsutomu, Sawai Keiichi, and Hiraishi Naoaki, signifi cantly 
reformed Maruyama’s earlier vision. Important cumulative works of some 
of these scholars published in the last two decades have cemented the idea 
of Confucianism in Japan as a predominantly privatized social force act-
ing upon the state from the outside.10 Indeed, Kurozumi Makoto suggested 
the “peripheral” position of Confucianism in Tokugawa political society 
as one of the defi ning features of early modern Japanese Confucianism.11 
This argument certainly holds for most of the early and mid-Tokugawa pe-
riod, but it has also directed attention away from the important minority 
of Confucians who ended up with central positions in the state in the late 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Second-generation researchers have 
tended to give precedence in their studies to early and mid-Tokugawa An-
cient Learning thinkers such as Ito¯ Jinsai, Ogyu¯ Sorai, and Dazai Shundai 
or else to Mito or National Learning scholars of the mid- or late Tokugawa 
period.12 In this sense, they have continued to focus on the same schol-
ars and movements highlighted by Maruyama, who in turn had analyzed 
study of the public imagination of Tokugawa political thinkers. In relation to issues around 
the public imagination of the “Three Kansei Professors” at the time, I am grateful to Constan-
tine Vaporis for pointing out references in samurai diaries to the collection of calligraphy by 
Koga Seiri during their sankin ko¯tai processions (see Constantine Nomikos Vaporis, Tour of 
Duty: Samurai, Military Service in Edo, and the Culture of Early Modern Japan [Honolulu: 
University of Hawai‘i Press, 2008], p. 214).
10. Kurozumi Makoto, Fukusu¯sei no Nihon shiso¯ (Tokyo: Perikansha, 2006); Kurozumi, 
Kinsei Nihon shakai to jukyo¯; Maeda Tsutomu, Edo ko¯ki no shiso¯ ku¯kan (Tokyo: Perikansha, 
2009); Maeda Tsutomu, Heigaku to shushigaku, rangaku, kokugaku: kinsei Nihon shiso¯shi 
no ko¯zu (Tokyo: Heibonsha, 2006); Maeda Tsutomu, Kinsei Nihon no jugaku to heigaku 
(Tokyo: Perikansha, 1996); Maeda Tsutomu, Kinsei Shinto¯ to kokugaku (Tokyo: Perikansha, 
2002); Kojima Yasunori, Soraigaku to han sorai (Tokyo: Perikansha, 1987); Sawai Keiichi, 
Kigo¯ to shite no jugaku (Tokyo: Ko¯bo¯sha, 2000); Watanabe Hiroshi, Nihon seiji shiso¯shi 
17–19 seiki (Tokyo: To¯kyo¯ Daigaku Shuppankai, 2010).
11. Herman Ooms and Kurozumi Makoto, “Introduction to ‘The Nature of Early Toku-
gawa Confucianism’ by Kurozumi Makoto,” Journal of Japanese Studies, Vol. 20 (1994), 
pp. 339–42.
12. The main exception is Maeda Tsutomu, Edo ko¯ki no shiso¯ ku¯kan. As Peter Fluecki-
ger has noted, although National Learning scholars tried to distinguish themselves from Con-
fucianism, they often “worked within an essentially Confucian worldview” (Peter Flueckiger, 
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the same fi gures chosen by Inoue Tetsujiro¯ at the beginning of the twenti-
eth century.13 With some important exceptions, most leading English- and 
French-language scholarship associated with this second-generation wave 
in Japan has tended to do likewise.14
The most recent Japanese scholarship, however, argues that the histo-
riography of the late Tokugawa period has been unfairly skewed toward 
valorizing these intellectual movements that later became associated with 
the Meiji Restoration (such as Mito and National Learning) at the expense 
of taking seriously the achievements of Sho¯heizaka scholars in shogunal 
reform.15 In 2007 Makabe Jin presented a comprehensive study reapprais-
ing the long-term political signifi cance and impact of Sho¯heizaka Acad-
“Refl ections on the Meaning of Our Country: Kamo no Mabuchi’s Kokuiko¯,” Monumenta 
Nipponica, Vol. 63 [2008], p. 212; see also note 3 on the same page).
13. Inoue Tetsujiro¯, Nihon yo¯meigakuha no tetsugaku (Tokyo: Tomiyamabo¯, 1900); Ino -
ue Tetsujiro¯, Nihon kogakuha no tetsugaku (Tokyo: Tomiyamabo¯, 1903); and Inoue Tetsujiro¯, 
Nihon shushigakuha no tetsugaku (Tokyo: Tomiyamabo¯, 1905).
14. See, for instance, work on National Learning by Peter Nosco, Remembering Para-
dise: Nativism and Nostalgia in Eighteenth-Century Japan (Cambridge, Mass: Council on 
East Asian Studies, Harvard University, 1990); on Mito Learning by Bob Tadashi Waka-
bayashi, Anti-Foreignism and Western Learning in Early-Modern Japan: The New Theses of 
1825 (Cambridge, Mass: Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard University, 1986); and on 
Ancient Learning by John A. Tucker, Ogyu¯ Sorai’s Philosophical Masterworks: The Bendo¯ 
and Benmei (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 2006), Samuel Hideo Yamashita, Master 
Sorai’s Responsals: An Annotated Translation of Sorai Sensei To¯monsho (Honolulu: Uni-
versity of Hawai‘i Press, 1994), Olivier Ansart, L’empire du rite: la pensée politique d’Ogyû 
Sorai, Japon 1666–1728 (Genève: Droz, 1998), and Naoki Sakai, Voices of the Past: The 
Status of Language in Eighteenth-Century Japanese Discourse (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1992), as well as Harry D. Harootunian, Toward Restoration: The Growth of Politi-
cal Consciousness in Tokugawa Japan (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970), and 
William Theodore de Bary, Principle and Practicality: Essays in Neo-Confucianism and 
Practical Learning (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979). Exceptions (cases where 
Western scholars have made studies of fi gures from outside the Inoue/Maruyama canoni-
cal model) include the works of Willem Jan Boot on Hayashi Razan (The Adoption and 
Adaptation of Neo-Confucianism in Japan: The Role of Fujiwara Seika and Hayashi Razan 
[Leiden: Lectura, 1982]), by Kate Wildman Nakai on Arai Hakuseki (Shogunal Politics: 
Arai Hakuseki and the Premises of Tokugawa Rule [Cambridge, Mass.: Council on East 
Asian Studies, Harvard University, 1988]), and by James McMullen (Idealism, Protest, and 
the Tale of Genji: The Confucianism of Kumazawa Banzan [1619–91] [Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1999]) on Kumazawa Banzan. Nonetheless, none of these has given attention to late 
Tokugawa Zhu Xi-ists associated with the Sho¯heizaka Academy.
15. Makabe Jin, Tokugawa ko¯ki no gakumon to seiji: sho¯heizaka gakumonjo jusha to 
bakumatsu gaiko¯ hen’yo¯ (Nagoya: Nagoya Daigaku Shuppankai, 2007), pp. 31–38. Makabe 
points out that writings of late Tokugawa Neo-Confucian thinkers associated with the sho gun-
ate were often excluded from printed Meiji compilations of Tokugawa writing that became the 
basis of later historiography. Makabe’s point here gels with arguments made by scholars such 
as Peter Kornicki, who have argued for the importance of studying nonprinted material for a 
better understanding of Tokugawa history (Peter F. Kornicki, “Manuscript, not Print: Scribal 
Culture in the Edo Period,” Journal of Japanese Studies, Vol. 32 [2006], pp. 23–52).
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emy scholars and the Neo-Confucian intellectual movement behind them.16 
Makabe’s exciting new work, combined with works arguing similar theses 
by Maeda Tsutomu and Matsuda Koichiro¯, has effected a revolution in the 
writing of late Tokugawa political thought history in Japan.17
Makabe’s work is signifi cantly different from second-generation schol-
arship in that it acknowledges the political contributions of thinkers associ-
ated with the shogunal institutions and bureaucracy. He also acknowledges, 
and seriously studies, late Tokugawa Neo-Confucianism itself as an intel-
lectual movement by showing its critical interaction with earlier Tokugawa, 
and also earlier and contemporary late imperial Chinese, political theory. In 
Makabe’s hands, late Tokugawa Neo-Confucianism is no longer a static, pri-
marily Song-infl uenced ideology, but a dynamic, contemporarily engaged, 
primarily Qing-infl uenced, and thereby potentially dynamically transna-
tional political discourse. This new research presents us with an opportunity 
to (re)integrate Tokugawa Confucianism back into the story of the develop-
ment of the Japanese state. This is why the new scholarly direction indicated 
by Makabe’s work is a signifi cant, and, as Nakada Yoshikazu has referred 
to it, “epoch-making” break from past scholarship on this  area.18 Makabe 
tells the story of late Tokugawa Neo-Confucianism through tracing three 
generations of the Koga family’s service in the Sho¯heizaka Academy during 
the nineteenth century. My earlier focus in this article on the late eighteenth 
century differs from Makabe’s in looking beyond the Koga clan and concen-
trates thematically on three processes that directly effected change in the 
state: bureaucratization, intellectualization, and internationalization.
Bureaucratization
The Tokugawa state was proudly feudal.19 The basic state structure of 
contemporaneous Qing China, certainly in the southern regions which had 
16. Makabe, Tokugawa ko¯ki no gakumon to seiji. See also Rai Ki’ichi, Kinsei ko¯ki 
shushigakuha no kenkyu¯ (Hiroshima: Keisuisha, 1986), the fi rst signifi cant monograph on 
late-Tokugawa Zhu Xi-ist Neo-Confucianism and a major infl uence on Makabe’s work.
17. Matsuda Ko¯ichiro¯, Edo no chishiki kara Meiji no seiji e (Tokyo: Perikansha, 2008). 
This 2009 Suntory Prize–winning treatise linking late Tokugawa academism and Meiji poli-
tics is laced with subtle comparisons to case studies from British political history. See also 
Maeda, Edo ko¯ki no shiso¯ ku¯kan.
18. Nakada Yoshikazu, “Tokugawa-ko¯ki no gakumon to seiji: sho¯heizaka gakumonjo-
jusha to bakumatsu gaiko¯ hen’yo¯,” Social Science Japan Journal, Vol. 13 (2010), p. 182.
19. I use the words “feudal” and “feudalism” in this article, to quote Howell, “in a limited 
sense to refer to the ties of vassalage that bound the samurai, including the daimyo¯, to their 
lords and to the sho¯gun.” I agree with Howell, however, that the term is also useful in describ-
ing socioeconomic aspects of the Tokugawa state more broadly (David Howell, “Territoriality 
and Collective Identity in Tokugawa Japan,” Daedalus, Vol. 127, No. 3 [1998], pp. 116–17). 
Fujii Jo¯ji has pointed out that even from the mid-seventeenth century the Tokugawa regime 
could be regarded as having moved from a purely feudal to a somewhat bureaucratic appoint-
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most contact with Japan, was based nominally on an ideal of absolutist 
bureaucratic rule in the name of the sovereign. This rule was supposed to 
be carried out by a bureaucracy appointed through examinations based on 
Confucian knowledge. Intriguingly, many Japanese Confucians considered 
this to be a callous and “loveless” form of rule.20 Japanese Confucian think-
ers, particularly those of the Sorai school, dominant in the years Koga Seiri 
was educated in his home, Saga han, unerringly defended feudalism, not 
simply because it was the system of their masters, but because, as they cor-
rectly pointed out, it was the system of rule that Confucius himself had ide-
alized in his praise of the ancient sage kings.21 Confucian political thought 
should be based on the sanctity of fi lial and loyal relations between sover-
eign and vassal as the basis of good government. These were individual rela-
tions of loyalty. The Tokugawa shogunate and the han states beneath it often 
acted administratively, for instance in terms of the fl ow of communication, 
through individual vassal relationships.22 This was usually seen as a posi-
tive. This focus on individual relations was regarded as giving feudalism its 
humane character.23
Koga Seiri and Shibano Ritsuzan, however, were highly critical of the 
reliance on lone individuals inherent in this system. Their primary recom-
mendation for the reform of administrative governance was the establish-
ment of a more professional bureaucratic structure. This recommendation, 
together with most of the other elements of the reform agenda they brought 
to Edo, is readily discernible in memorials they produced directly before 
their shogunal appointments: Shibano Ritsuzan’s Ritsuzan jo¯sho (Ritsu-
zan’s memorial), written the year he left his position as Confucian advisor 
ment system because the appointment of senior offi cials was not done on a solely hereditary 
basis (Fujii Jo¯ji, Edo jidai no kanryo¯sei [Tokyo: Aoki Shoten, 1999]; Fujii Jo¯ji, “Nihon kinsei 
shakai ni okeru kanryo¯ to guntai,” in Umesao Tadao and Matsubara Masatake, eds., To¯chi 
kiko¯ no bunmeigaku [Tokyo: Chu¯o¯ko¯ronsha, 1986], pp. 25–55). This is true but was relevant 
only for some higher positions. Furthermore, as Hashimoto Akihiko has pointed out, despite 
Tokugawa Yoshimune’s attempts during the Kyo¯ho reforms (1716–45), intellectual endeavor 
and administrative and advisory capacity were not systematically taken into account in sho-
gunate appointments at all until the Kansei reforms (from 1794 onward) (Hashimoto Akihiko, 
Edo bakufu shiken seidoshi no kenkyu¯ [Tokyo: Kazama Shobo¯, 1993], p. 11). Even then, as 
discussed below, meeting basic hereditary requirements was still a necessary prerequisite for 
appointment. Examinations were used primarily to differentiate between the increasingly 
large numbers of candidates who were hereditarily qualifi ed for a correspondingly insuf-
fi cient number of available positions.
20. This term is used by Ogyu¯ Sorai in Bendo¯, in Ogyu¯ Sorai, Nihon shiso¯ taikei, Vol. 36 
(Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1973), p. 22.
21. Ibid., p. 41.
22. Mark Ravina, “State-Building and Political Economy in Early-modern Japan,” Jour-
nal of Asian Studies, Vol. 54 (1995), p. 1008.
23. Ogyu¯, Bendo¯, pp. 17, 21–22.
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to the Awa han in Shikoku and took up his appointment to the shogunate in 
1788, and Koga Seiri’s Ju¯jikai (Explication of 10 matters), written in 1789 
while he was state Confucian scholar and head of the Confucian Ko¯do¯kan 
Academy in his home han of Hizen Saga on Kyushu.24
For Koga, the complexity of modern governance was more than any 
individual could handle alone and demanded that bureaucratic structures 
be professionalized: “Those who stand above the people, who have the re-
sponsibility of governing the country and succoring the masses, due to the 
weighty nature of their positions, could not carry out even one of their tasks 
if it was left all to the personal knowledge of just this one individual.”25 
Alone, no one, no matter how talented, could possibly have enough knowl-
edge to succeed. Progress requires the exchange of information and knowl-
edge, a cooperative professional approach to governance carried out by 
groups of people rather than individuals, and the training of people capable 
of directing and working within this system. Koga insisted that tasks of the 
highest importance could not be adequately carried out by individuals alone 
but required larger pools of knowledge. One important example he gave 
relates to the responsibility for communicating information from the lower 
orders up to the leaders.
The path for the reception of information should not be restricted to one 
offi ce. Elders, and also especially people of skill, should be invited as part-
ners in discussion, to consult on matters large and small when the affairs of 
state allow time for this. Extracting the good from these kinds of discus-
sions should be the pleasure of an exemplary leader.26
Only through a more professional structure that allowed access to the 
leader from a range of specialists (“people of skill”) could the openness of 
communication be achieved that would ensure just rule. This is a key argu-
ment that linked the works of Shibano Ritsuzan and Koga Seiri. Shibano 
24. The date of writing of Ritsuzan jo¯sho is disputed. Hashimoto Akihiko suggests that 
Kaneko Tokunosuke’s argument that it was written around 1763 is reasonably convincing 
(Hashimoto, Edo bakufu shiken seidoshi no kenkyu¯, p. 13; Kaneko Tokunosuke, “Kansei 
igaku no kin no kenkyu¯,” Koten kenkyu¯ [Yu¯zankaku], Series 4, Vol. 10, No. 4 [1937]). The 
primary text I have consulted for the research on this article is Shibano Ritsuzan, Ritsuzan 
jo¯sho (1788) (manuscript in Nanki Bunko collection in the General Library of the University 
of Tokyo). However, for the reader’s ease of reference, in citations I give page number refer-
ences to the more widely available printed edition in Takimoto Sei’ichi, ed., Nihon keizai 
so¯sho, Vol. 17 (Tokyo: Nihon Keizai So¯sho Kanko¯kai, 1917). There are signifi cant omissions 
and faults in this Nihon Keizai So¯sho volume which are not found in most of the numerous 
manuscript editions.
25. Koga Seiri, Ju¯jikai (1789), in Takimoto, ed., Nihon keizai so¯sho, Vol. 17, p. 156.
26. Ibid., p. 157.
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was eloquently direct about defi ning what kind of information and com-
munication that professional structure needed to provide:
“The prince is like a boat, the masses like the water. The water can support 
a boat well, but can also overturn it. The masses can live well under the rule 
of a prince, or they can destroy him.” The winds and waves of the masses 
rise when the sentiments of the masses are obstructed. For this reason, 
since antiquity, making sure the sentiments of the masses are communi-
cated has been the primary business of governance. “Communicating the 
sentiments of the masses” means ensuring the sovereign is informed about 
the suffering of the masses.27
Here, Shibano emphasized the importance of taking due account of the 
“sentiments of the masses” (Ch. xiaqing, J. kajo¯). In a note directly after 
the sentences quoted above, Shibano mentions a number of the later classic 
references for this turn of phrase in Chinese dynastic histories like the Han 
shu (Book of the Han).28 The quote that opens this paragraph, “the prince 
is like a boat, the people like the water,” although existing in earlier texts 
like Xunzi, is famously contained in the traditional house records of Con-
fucius in the Hou Han shu (Book of the later Han). Through his quotation 
of this phrase and his emphasis on the importance of the “sentiments of the 
masses,” an idea originating in legalist thought but most heavily cited in the 
Han shu and Hou Han shu, Shibano appealed to Chinese traditions empha-
sizing the ruler’s requirement to listen to the people. His use of concepts, 
vocabulary, and quotations preferred by notable Han scholar and editor of 
the Han shu, Ban Gu (32–92), is also noteworthy. The trend to employ Ban 
Gu heavily is associated in Chinese texts and the examination culture of 
27. Shibano, Ritsuzan jo¯sho, pp. 106–7. The quote that opens this section is traditionally 
attributed to Confucius through the lost text Kongzi jiayu, contained in the Hou Han shu (Fan 
Ye, Xin Jiao Ben Hou Han Shu Bing Fu Bian Shi San Zhong [Taipei: Ding Wen Shu Ju, 1985], 
p. 2132). It is also contained in Xunzi.
28. Shibano, Ritsuzan jo¯sho, p. 107. The phrase is well used in Han shu edited by Ban 
Gu, and in Hou Han shu, as well as in other works by Ban Gu such as Liangdufu. In Han shu 
and the later dynastic history Hou Han shu, the term is often used in combination with the 
word 通 tong (tsu¯) (communicate) or 上通 shangtong ( jo¯tsu¯) (communicate upward) (Ban Gu 
and Dingyi Zhuang, Xin Jiao Ben Han Shu Bing Fu Bian Er Zhong [Taipei: Ding Wen Shu 
Ju, 1985], pp. 247, 1421, 4170, 50, 82, 111, 1398, 1556, 1766, 1910). The term originates in the 
legalist writings of Guanzi. This again could be seen as showing the infl uence of pre-Song 
ideas in Qing Neo-Confucian writing. The phrase is also attributed to traditional histories/
myths associated with the Japanese Emperor Jinmu, contained in the Nihon seiki, which was 
compiled as histories by Rai Shunsui’s son Rai Sanyo¯. The most common reference for these 
is Rai Sanyo¯’s Nihon gaishi (published from the 1830s). Given the link between Rai Shunsui 
and Koga and Shibano, it is interesting to see the term playing such a large role in the work of 
these latter two, decades before the appearance of Sanyo¯’s most famous work.
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late imperial China with the switch from the Ming to the Qing empire.29 In 
other words, this preference of Shibano, albeit for a number of phrases and 
ideas of a Han scholar, is a hint to contemporary Qing infl uence—an issue 
I return to later.
Shibano proceeds from this quote to explain how a state that is respon-
sive to this requirement can be achieved through structural reform. The 
main solution he suggests, in a section reminiscent of Koga, is to make 
sure the responsibility and capability for communicating situations on the 
ground up to the senior leadership rest with multiple rather than individual 
offi cers. In other words, instead of a system of individual, exclusive relations 
typical of a feudal hierarchy, Shibano recommends a more professional ap-
proach to the delivery of recent intelligence and information, as well as 
the all-important “sentiments of the masses,” to the leadership through the 
bureaucracy.30
Koga gave a similar political justifi cation for his plan to corporatize 
the bureaucracy, arguing for the importance of increasing bottom-up input 
into the political system through reference to the key Confucian concept 
of “remonstration” (using a construction of the term favored by Ban Gu).31 
Koga argued that the only way the sovereign could ensure that remonstra-
tion was carried out was to reform the structures. He argued for this reform 
in a surprisingly radical manner by suggesting that the entire tradition of 
“remonstration,” something key to good governance in Confucianism, was 
traditionally lacking in Japan and thereby also in its current (feudal) struc-
tures of power.
In Japan particularly, the custom of remonstration is not performed. Lines 
of communication are normally closed and the sentiments of the masses 
29. Benjamin Elman has noted that one of the major differences in the textual interpreta-
tion sought in imperial examinations between the Ming and the Qing was the Qing emphasis 
on Ban Gu (Benjamin A. Elman, A Cultural History of Civil Examinations in Late Imperial 
China [Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000], p. xxxv).
30. Shibano, Ritsuzan Jo¯sho, p. 108. Luke Roberts discusses the link between call-
ing for political input from the common people and the use of this input for intelligence 
 purposes—particularly in terms of identifying corrupt offi cials. In the same article, he sum-
marizes the history of commoners contributing their sentiments to political leaders in the 
Tokugawa period through the petition-box system (Luke S. Roberts, “The Petition Box in 
Eighteenth-Century Tosa,” Journal of Japanese Studies, Vol. 20 [1994], p. 428).
31. For “remonstration,” Koga uses the two-character combination 諫諍 jianzheng 
(kanso¯). This combination fi rst appears in isolated usage in the writing of Xunzi. It is used 
earliest in a frequent manner to denote Confucian remonstration in Han shu, edited by Ban 
Gu, such as in the twenty-third volume, “The Sage King appoints vassals who remonstrate.” 
The single character representation 諫 jian (kan), appears initially in Zhouli, twelve times in 
Lunyu, eight times in Mencius, also notably in Kongzi Jiayu as recorded in Hou Han shu, 
“Confucius said, ‘The loyal vassal will remonstrate with the prince.’”
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are not communicated up to those on high. This is because the path of 
education is not propagated. A sovereign who would leave behind the bad 
practices of former years and set right the state must fi rst collect the knowl-
edge of many people. To do this, there is nothing more urgent than open-
ing the channels of communication. [Currently] retainers and those below 
them with important offi ces and positions of service are used as a matter 
of course, and all others are not. [Yet] by utilizing them, all functions 
could be thoroughly carried out, the virtue of the sovereign assisted, and 
hindrances to the truth reaching the ears of the sovereign removed.32
Koga here not only displayed the political motivation for a more profes-
sional and rationalized bureaucracy but also showed how radical his ideas 
for government reform were by linking offi ce to function. He suggested 
that the allocation of position should be linked to the utility of the role 
performed. In contemporary late imperial China, there had been for at least 
a couple of centuries disquiet over the fact that the conferment of imperial 
rank (achieved through examination results) was not necessarily directly 
linked to the allocation of post. Benjamin Elman has written about the way 
the Ming and Qing states attempted to regulate the numbers of people who 
would take imperial rank through changes to the examination pass quotas.33 
A highly visible and growing disparity emerged between the number of 
people with basic examination grade status and the number of functions 
available. Thus, a discourse had arisen linking rank to function, a discourse 
Koga would have been aware of.
This debate continued as an issue in late imperial Chinese society. The 
allocation of rank, even without appointment to a post, could still be attrac-
tive to rulers because it played the role of placating the precocious and locally 
powerful gentry. In the feudal context of Tokugawa Japan, the allocation of 
rank—not of course through examination, but through appointment related 
to hereditary and other family ties—also worked as a way to placate senior 
vassals who might come from high families but have no particular post. 
Appointment as “superfl uous offi cers” (Jp. jo¯’in; Ch. rongyuan)—a phrase 
in the Chinese, especially Ming and Qing, discourse, adopted by Koga to 
describe offi cials in Japan receiving a stipend while holding no function—
could thereby be seen to play an important pragmatic political role in both 
contexts. The negative impact of this practice in the Chinese context was 
that it then devalued the imperial rank. In the Japanese context, where these 
32. Koga, Ju¯jikai, pp. 156–57.
33. Elman, Cultural History of Civil Examinations, pp. 138–42. Elman also described 
a kind of late imperial examination infl ation where the number of licentiates increased while 
the number of positions fell (Elman and Woodside, Education and Society in Late Imperial 
China, p. 113).
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appointments were linked to extra stipends, the practice was even more seri-
ously deleterious, potentially siphoning off resources from the limited pool 
of monies available for central government administration.34
Koga hit out at these superfl uous appointments, which he brazenly 
stated displayed the ruler’s “weakness of will.”35 The maintenance or exten-
sion of appointments should be directly related to functional requirements 
of governance. Unnecessary functions should be abolished so the number of 
functionaries could be limited. Koga’s statement that “the requirements of 
governance may rise or fall depending on the times and situations, and this 
may then require the appointment of more or fewer bureaucrats,” argued 
that appointment should be based on administrative demand.36 This implied 
something he later made abundantly clear, that “superfl uous offi cers” who 
had no useful function, appointed by “weak-willed” leaders out of a mis-
placed sense of personal allegiance, would need to be cut.
It is said that adding one advantage is not equal to eliminating one dis-
advantage. Adding one position is not equal to eliminating one function. 
Adding offi cers should not be preferred. It should rather be ably assessed 
why the number of functions is more than before. If it is unavoidable, then 
increased numbers should be appointed, but functions of no utility should 
also be cut so that the number of offi cers does not become too many.37
This was a radical suggestion in a society and state based on the prin-
ciples of hereditary right to position and status. As an idea, it potentially 
cut to the core of the hereditary traditions of appointment that underlay 
the Tokugawa state by suggesting that the imperative for an appointment 
should be the nature of the task to be performed rather than the status of the 
person being appointed. The impact of Koga, Shibano, and their Sho¯heizaka 
Academy colleagues on appointments is most evident through the process 
of academic institutionalization of their ideas that occurred through the 
nationalization of the Sho¯heizaka Academy and the role it was given in the 
education and examination of prospective shogunate offi cers.
Intellectualization (I): The Examination Orthodoxy
As our country is under a regime of generals, the path of selection/election 
is closed. Particularly in han such as ours [Saga], the damage of the heredi-
tary system is not to be avoided. Those with hereditary status are negligent, 
34. As Elman has noted, fi nancial compensation on a lower level was also given to li-
centiates (Cultural History of Civil Examinations, p. 138), and they also benefi ted from other 
preferential treatment such as tax exemptions (pp. 241–42, 298).
35. Koga, Ju¯jikai, p. 158.
36. Ibid., p. 157.
37. Ibid., p. 158.
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and those without do not serve. This is why the spirit of the gentleman/
samurai cannot be enacted and why custom can so degenerate.38
Through the Sho¯heizaka Academy, Koga and Shibano introduced an exami-
nation system that signifi cantly infl uenced appointments to the shogunate 
bureaucracy. But that does not mean that a meritocracy was introduced. Nor 
should quotes like the one above from Koga be taken to connote that he and 
his colleagues believed in what we might call a meritocracy or in the intro-
duction of a Chinese-style examination system.39 Although the examination 
system administered by the Sho¯heizaka Academy became a powerful fast 
track to appointment, the right to be in the selection pool was still tied to 
hereditary status. The examinations simply introduced an element of com-
petition linked to performance in training.
This fi t with Koga’s and Shibano’s approach to the use of competition 
and examinations in appointment. In eighteenth-century Japan, some Con-
fucian scholars, Dazai Shundai for instance, called for the introduction of a 
fully competitive, literary-based examination system.40 Koga and Shibano 
stood against this call. Shibano condemned the Chinese imperial examina-
tion system, which was a completely literary affair, as impractical and reli-
ant on literary games. This fi t perfectly with the main intellectual argument 
that Sho¯heizaka Confucians had against Japanese Sorai learning, that it was 
too literary and not practical enough.41 Shibano recommended that appoint-
ments should be related to a system of “reward and punishment” based on 
performance in training exercises as well as administrative and military 
tasks.42 Shibano and Koga did not recommend a relationship between gov-
ernance and impractical, purely literary knowledge. Rather, infl uenced by 
Chinese criticism of the too-literary examinations in that country43 and of 
the tradition of writing about the nexus between intellectualism and the 
warrior tradition in Tokugawa Japan, they advocated a system of diverse, 
practical training, backed by a standardized (and thereby necessarily ortho-
dox) general education in Confucian ethics.44
The relationship between the traditional justifi cation for the privileged 
position of the samurai caste as warriors and their major Tokugawa-era 
38. Ibid., p. 160. Note that Koga here used the word han 藩 to indicate Saga han and 
kuni 邦 to indicate Japan under the shogunate.
39. Of course, the late imperial Chinese examination system was also clearly not a meri-
tocracy (Elman, Cultural History of Civil Examinations, pp. xxix, 248).
40. See, in particular, references to ideas about “competition” from Dazai Shundai, 
Ogyu¯ Sorai’s premier student, in Matsuda, Edo no chishiki kara Meiji no seiji e, p. 81.
41. Shibano, Ritsuzan jo¯sho, pp. 135–36.
42. Ibid., p. 146.
43. See, for instance, writings by Chen Qixin, quoted in Elman, Cultural History of 
Civil Examinations, p. 215.
44. Shibano, Ritsuzan jo¯sho, pp. 143–47.
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role as civil administrators had been a major topic of scholarly discus-
sion throughout the Tokugawa period. The text cited as one of the main 
Tokugawa sources on the “Way of the Samurai,” Yamaga Soko¯’s (1622–85) 
Shido¯, ironically opens with a Confucian discussion on the ethical responsi-
bilities of the samurai and their requirement to develop through intellectual 
education their “way of culture” alongside their military arts.45 This contin-
ued as a theme in the writing of many of the great political thinkers of the 
early and mid-Tokugawa period such as Kumazawa Banzan, Nakae To¯ju, 
and Kaibara Ekiken.46 Koga and Shibano thus inherited a long tradition of 
packaging or presenting Chinese classical thought in combination with the 
martial arts as a basis of practical ethics. This tradition they saw as being 
challenged by the dominant trend following Ogyu¯ So¯rai which emphasized 
literary theory and purely literary, linguistic, and ritualistic techniques to 
recover the Confucian “Way.” 47 Through fi rst their han schools and then the 
Sho¯heizaka Academy, Koga, Shibano, and their colleagues institutionalized 
their practical approach to Confucian learning in state schools and thereby 
in the bureaucratic education and selection systems of the states. They did 
that through the establishment of these schools (han and later shogunal 
academies) as institutions and through the institutionalization in these acad-
emies of an intellectual “school” (late Tokugawa Neo-Confucianism) as 
a standardized, institutionalized intellectual orthodoxy realizing ideals of 
practical, ethical learning (thereby countering the literary trend).
The creation of the Sho¯heizaka’s late Tokugawa Neo-Confucian or-
thodoxy had surprisingly pluralist roots. Koga Seiri, Bito¯ Jishu¯, Shibano 
Ritsuzan, and Rai Shunsui (1746–1816) had all been part of a movement 
of independent scholars in Osaka during the 1770s and 1780s that cogently 
argued against the infl uence of Sorai-school Confucianism and for a Neo-
Confucian orthodoxy. Their vision of a Neo-Confucian orthodoxy, and par-
ticularly Matsudaira Sadanobu’s state regulation of it through the Kansei 
Prohibition of Heterodoxy in 1790, attracted the ire of twentieth-century 
scholars who saw this as a state-imposed limitation on academic freedom 
and a closure of the market of ideas. It is important to note, however, that the 
idea for orthodoxy was not originated by the state but was an inherent part 
of nearly all Confucian discourse in East Asia by this time. The construc-
tion of this orthodoxy, moreover, was achieved predominantly by indepen-
dent scholars in Osaka nearly 20 years prior to the Kansei Prohibition of 
45. Yamaga Soko¯, Shido¯, in Yamaga Soko¯, Yamaga Soko¯, Nihon shiso¯ taikei, Vol. 32 
(Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1970), p. 32.
46. All these writers used a term with an even older lineage, bunbu ryo¯do¯—”both the 
literary and military ways,” from the Heike monogatari.
47. On the history of anti-Sorai writing through the eighteenth century, including refer-
ences to Bito¯ Jishu¯, see Kojima, Soraigaku to han sorai, pp. 135–53.
40 Journal of Japanese Studies 38:1 (2012)
Heterodoxy. Further, it is fairly clear that the motivation behind these schol-
ars’ construction of their “Neo-Confucian orthodoxy,” and of Shibano’s and 
Matsudaira’s utilization of it in the shogunal academy, was primarily to 
create a standardized fi eld of practical knowledge where knowledge would 
be utilized and assessed in terms of its functional capacity.48
This explains the seeming contradiction of Koga Seiri and his descen-
dants in arguing forcefully for the institutionalized study of Western learn-
ing on the one hand, and their view that literary theory related to Sorai-
school Confucianism should be excluded from any written examinations 
on the other.49 For them, knowledge was something to be used in statecraft. 
For Koga and his colleagues, the only knowledge that should be included 
in the curriculum, or required for the examinations, was knowledge that 
could be shown to have practical application.50 This approach was not an 
ideology of closed, static conservatism; rather, it opened up the academies 
to learning from the Chinese military and legalist classics—genres that had 
always been popular among Tokugawa samurai Confucians—and eventu-
ally to Western learning as well.51 More important, it stamped into political 
society as never before the idea of a functional link between knowledge and 
the performance of government administration.52
It also allowed for a greater variety of Confucian interpretation than 
has often been assumed and encouraged the development of non-Confucian 
specialist skills and knowledge. Koga himself had been a follower of Con-
fucian theory aligned with Wang Yangming when he fi rst went to study 
in Kyoto in the mid-1770s. Indeed, many of the political arguments Koga 
became famous for, including advocacy for a more rational selection system 
for bureaucrats and an easing of the economic stress on peasants through 
land reform,53 had fi rst been championed in the Tokugawa period by schol-
ars identifi ed with the Yangming inclination such as Kumazawa Banzan.54 
But in the mid-1700s, the major intellectual confrontation in Confucianism 
in Japan was between the ascendant followers of Sorai theory and a new 
wave of opposition to them that identifi ed itself with Neo-Confucianism 
of the Zhu Xi school.55 It is important to understand that the opposition to 
48. Shibano, Ritsuzan jo¯sho, p. 135.
49. On the role of the Koga family in Western learning, see the next section and also 
Makabe, Tokugawa ko¯ki no gakumon to seiji, pp. 219–493.
50. Shibano, Ritsuzan jo¯sho, pp. 135–37.
51. For openness to military and Western thought in education, see Shibano, Ritsuzan 
jo¯sho, p. 178.
52. Matsuda, Edo no chishiki kara Meiji no seiji e, pp. 79–80.
53. Koga, Ju¯jikai, pp. 158–59.
54. McMullen, Idealism, Protest, and the Tale of Genji, pp. 108–45.
55. An excellent representation of this confl ict depicted through statistics based on the 
affi liations of han schools can be found in Ishikawa, Nihon gakko¯shi no kenkyu¯, pp. 258–59. 
In 1716 to 1788, there were 118 schools aligned with Sorai and 5 with Hayashi or Sho¯hei; from 
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Sorai-school Confucianism of this period was not necessarily an opposition 
to the ideas of Sorai himself,56 but more to the literary theorism that had 
developed around the disciples of Sorai in the decades after his death in 
1728.57 The primary criticism that people such as Koga and Shibano had of 
Sorai Confucianism as they encountered it in the private and regional acad-
emies in the mid-eighteenth century was ironically the same criticism they 
had of the appointment and governance systems of the shogunate: they had 
no social utility, they did not achieve the reform of state, society, and people 
necessary to create a more just order. For them, Sorai-school Confucianism 
had descended into an intellectual game, yet another escapist leisure pursuit 
of the Edo elite, instead of becoming a blueprint for bettering the world.
Importantly, although Sho¯heizaka Academic scholars identifi ed them-
selves as Neo-Confucian, and attempted to exploit the earlier relationship of 
the Hayashi family to the shogunate, they were positive about most streams 
of Confucianism in Japan other than the Sorai school. As noted above, the 
ideas of Koga were clearly infl uenced by Japanese Confucians who identi-
fi ed themselves with the Yangming tendency. Shibano, in the section of his 
memorial to the shogunate dealing with education, went further by naming 
a number of famous Tokugawa Confucians not of the Neo-Confucian school 
as examples of the kind of “scholarship of the princely way” which could 
effect cultured remonstration in government. In these terms, he praised by 
name Arai Hakuseki, Muro Kyu¯so¯, Kumazawa Banzan, Nakae To¯ju, Ya-
mazaki Ansai, Ito¯ Jinsai, and Ito¯ To¯gai.58 Four of these seven were not Neo-
Confucian but Yangming-ist (Banzan and To¯ju) or from non-Sorai Ancient 
Learning schools (Jinsai and To¯gai). Moreover, the justifi cation for ortho-
doxy, and the parameters in terms of which other ideas were criticized, was 
always in terms of the search for a utilitarian canon of public knowledge 
that could be used as the basis for public service training—something that 
could aid the development of senses of “consensus” and “solidarity” among 
fellows, and “sympathy” for the masses.59
This was not a vision of the clash between Sorai-ist and Neo-Confucian 
inclinations which originated from Matudaira Sadanobu or from his ideas 
on heterodoxy. It originated earlier with independent scholars in Osaka and 
Kyoto such as Rai Shunsui and Bito¯ Jishu¯ in the 1770s and was spread to han 
academies by the likes of Shibano Ritsuzan and Koga Seiri before being 
taken up into the apparatus of the central state after Shibano’s appointment 
1789 to 1829, there were 56 aligned with Sorai and 55 with Sho¯hei; and from 1830 to 1867, 13 
were aligned with Sorai and 160 with Sho¯hei.
56. Sho¯heizaka scholars were even capable of praising some of Sorai’s work; see Shi-
bano, Ritsuzan jo¯sho, p. 135.
57. Kojima, Soraigaku to han sorai, pp. 47–48.
58. Shibano, Ritsuzan jo¯sho, p. 136.
59. Ibid., pp. 134, 145.
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to the Sho¯heizaka Academy.60 The motivation for the origination of this 
“orthodoxy” also appears to have been anything other than silencing the 
political voices of scholars. Making sure scholars had political impact, that 
rulers listened to them, and that systems of government responded to them 
was a major, perhaps the major, theme of the Three Kansei Professors. For 
Shibano, the entire process of institutionalizing academia within the state 
was in order to effect cultured remonstration on the leadership. As he wrote 
in his memorial to the shogun: “The main goal of princely scholarship is to 
have the sovereign act upon words of remonstration.”61
Moreover, these ideas on the necessary utility of Confucianism and 
the critique of literary theory (associated in Japan with attacks on the Sorai 
school) were themselves inspired by Chinese Qing Confucian reactions to 
the effect of Ming literary theory on Confucianism in China.62 The critique 
of these contemporary Chinese commentators often pointedly targeted 
literary theorists of the Ming, such as Wang Shizhen (1526–90), who are 
regarded as having decisively infl uenced the development of Ogyu¯ Sorai’s 
own Confucian philosophy of ancient textual study (kobunjigaku) in Ja-
pan.63 Criticism of this kind of approach had to itself use evidential scholar-
ship to mount a counterargument. Neo-Confucian argumentation in Qing 
China, and thereby in late Tokugawa Japan as well, took on what appeared, 
especially in comparison to earlier Song learning, to be a highly evidential 
approach. Students were expected to prove an argument through references. 
This was a far cry from the kind of Neo-Confucian orthodoxy imagined by 
Hayashi Razan. The textual and proof-based nature of the “orthodoxy” es-
tablished in the Sho¯heizaka Academy is evident in any basic perusal of the 
academy’s examinations or rules. For example, the academy’s rules state: 
“To debate the principle of righteousness, or research the profound, there 
must be a [textual] basis. Unsupported hypothesizing is not allowed.”64
The intellectual practice of the Sho¯heizaka Academy was thus evidence 
based. Although the intellectual inclination was, as Koga and Shibano had 
made clear, toward the ethics of Neo-Confucianism in order to cultivate 
60. In this sense, not only Shibano Ritsuzan, Bito¯ Jishu¯, and Koga Seiri but also scholars 
who were active in that movement in Osaka but did not take up positions at the Sho¯heizaka 
Academy or any other state institution could be considered part of the creation of this ortho-
doxy. One could extend the net to the Rai family, certainly to Shunsui, and also to Minagawa 
Kien and Nakai Chikuzan.
61. Shibano, Ritsuzan jo¯sho, p. 137.
62. Makabe, Tokugawa ko¯ki no gakumon to seiji, pp. 232–48.
63. David Pollack, The Fracture of Meaning: Japan’s Synthesis of China from the Eighth 
through the Eighteenth Centuries (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), p. 222.
64. Bito¯ Jishu¯ and Inuzuka Son, Sho¯heishi (1792), in Kurokawa Masamichi, ed., Nihon 
kyo¯iku buko, gakko¯hen (Tokyo: Do¯bunkan, 1911), pp. 21–23. Makabe, Tokugawa ko¯ki no 
gakumon to seiji, p. 236.
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meritorious individual bureaucrats, the method of thinking nurtured was a 
practical evidential one, which was also supposed to assist in the development 
and application of the specialized skills that Shibano had made clear were 
essential for government.65 This push toward more practical and evidential 
education was the general context within which the Sho¯heizaka Academy’s 
examinations came to take on greater sociopolitical meaning by becoming 
institutionally linked to processes of appointment in the shogunate.
Intellectualization (II): Examinations and Appointment
Ultimately, the Sho¯heizaka Academy scholars affected shogunal ap-
pointment most directly through their role in administering the academy 
examination system, which exercised an increasing infl uence on appoint-
ment. As Hashimoto Akihito has noted, the complexity of the systems of 
appointment, coupled with an incompleteness of records from some periods 
and seeming incongruities between offi cial shogunate records and personal 
memoirs and diaries, makes a comprehensive assessment of the infl uence 
of the post-Kansei examination systems across the breadth of the shogunate 
bureaucracy diffi cult.66 Hashimoto has shown fairly conclusively, however, 
that from the mid-1790s onward, attainment of the top A (kinoe) or B (ki-
noto) grades in the Sho¯heizaka Academy examinations made a speedy ap-
pointment into a bureaucratic post highly likely for those who, by being 
heads of hatamoto households of the shogunate, met the basic hereditary 
qualifi cations for consideration for appointment.67 By the 1790s, the number 
of these household heads signifi cantly exceeded the number of real posi-
tions available in the shogunate. Most were unlikely ever to be appointed 
to a real position, and the appointments that were attained usually came 
after a long, unpredictable wait of many years.68 Hashimoto’s research re-
sults show, however, that success in the examinations all but ensured the 
candidate would be appointed into a shogunate position within a couple of 
years.
Table 1 lists the numbers of hatamoto family heads who passed the 
examinations with an A or B grade between 1794 and 1806, the time it took 
them to be appointed, and the percentage of the total appointed within ten 
years of the examination. Hashimoto acknowledges that breaks in the data 
make it impossible to track possible later appointment of some of these can-
didates, meaning the statistics represent the most minimalistic assessment 
of the impact of success in the examinations. The appointment rate may 
have in fact been signifi cantly higher. Hashimoto believes the impact of ex-
65. Shibano, Ritsuzan jo¯sho, p. 145.
66. Hashimoto, Edo bakufu shikken seidoshi no kenkyu¯, pp. 138–53.
67. Ibid., pp. 141–42.
68. Ibid., p. 119.
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Table 1
Sho¯heizaka Examinations and Shogunate Appointments
Year
Number 
of A+B 
graduates
Appointment 
within 1 year
Appointment 
within 3 years
Appointment 
within 5 years
Total 
percentage 
appointed
1794 3 3 - - 100
1797 11 0 4 4 731
1800 7 0 5 0 862
1803 8 0 5 0 753
1806 7 4 0 2 86
Notes:
1. Two of the candidates in 1797 were not appointed because their fathers were currently 
serving members of the kobushin.
2. One of the candidates in 1800 (Natsume Cho¯emon) already had an appointment.
3. A sixth candidate was employed six years after the examination.
Source: Hashimoto Akihiko, Edo bakufu shiken seidoshi no kenkyu¯ (Tokyo: Kazama Shobo¯, 
1993), pp. 138–53.
aminations on appointments from 1806 rose, although there are insuffi cient 
extant data to prove that comprehensively through statistics.
Hashimoto shows, however, that although examination performance 
usually ensured appointment, it did not advantageously affect what division 
of the bureaucracy a candidate was appointed into. In fact, he fairly conclu-
sively shows that the bureaucratic destination of examination  graduates was 
determined solely by the agency of appointment of the candidate’s father. 
In other words, candidates whose fathers had worked in high-prestige agen-
cies, such as metsuke, would also be appointed into high-prestige agencies, 
and those whose fathers had worked in lower-prestige agencies, such as 
o¯ban, would generally also be appointed into such lower prestige agen-
cies.69 Hashimoto interprets this to suggest that “the ultimate position of 
appointment for examination graduates had no relation to the level of their 
examination grades and was determined instead by the employment level 
of their fathers.”70
Although Hashimoto seems to have proven fairly conclusively that the 
destination of the initial appointment of examination graduates was deter-
mined by hereditary means, I suggest this does not necessarily mean they 
did not thereafter have the opportunity for further promotion or transfer, nor 
that the career effect of their performance in the examinations was limited to 
their initial appointment. The famous case of O¯ta Nanpo (1749–1823) shows 
opportunity for promotion of successful examination candidates within the 
bureaucracy after initial appointment, and well beyond their fathers’ level. 
69. Ibid., p. 147.
70. Ibid., p. 148.
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O¯ta was one of the three A graduates in the initial 1794 examination and 
was immediately appointed into a rather low-level position in the guards 
in line with the status of his father. Within a few years, however, he had 
been transferred twice to more prestigious agencies, the Kanjo¯ Bugyo¯ and 
Yu¯shima Seido¯.71 He was also fairly quickly promoted within the Kanjo¯ 
Bugyo¯. O¯ta’s case also suggests that this promotion was likely infl uenced by 
the intellectual prestige associated with the candidate, a prestige the exami-
nation results confi rmed and institutionalized. Hashimoto’s evidence about 
the initial posting of graduates, therefore, probably does not tell the whole 
story of the advantageous effect of examination prestige on a candidate’s 
career.
Moreover, beyond this direct infl uence of ensuring appointment for A 
and B graduates, lesser success in the examinations or even just good at-
tendance at the academy could assist candidates in their push for appoint-
ment. Hashimoto points out, for instance, that exam graduates with a C 
(hinoe) or above would be exempt from elements of the general shogunate 
selection procedures, thereby allowing them to advance more quickly.72 
Also, Sho¯heizaka Academy staff would often write recommendations 
for students, which appeared to affect appointment and promotion.73 The 
fact that A and B graduates were basically automatically employed by the 
shogunate showed that the examinations had an institutionalized position 
in the appointment process. Further, however, the existence of this latter 
para-institutional practice of recommendation writing and lobbying by the 
Sho¯heizaka Academy for its students shows that even beyond the increased 
institutional role of the Sho¯heizaka examinations, attendance at the acad-
emy and performance in the examinations likely gave candidates advan-
tages over nonscholars.
The impact of Koga, Shibano, and their Sho¯heizaka Academy col-
leagues on appointment, however, should not be assessed only in terms of 
concrete data on appointment but also in terms of the effect that academic 
institutionalization and the nationalization of the Sho¯heizaka Academy had 
more generally on the education of prospective shogunate offi cials and on 
the attitudes of those prospective offi cials toward education. Appointments 
based on examination results had more impact than the raw statistics sug-
gest. The institutionalization of appointments based on examination results, 
despite its limited scope, also served as an important public symbol of the 
state’s promotion of an increasing intellectualization of the bureaucracy and 
its vassal recruitment base during this period, representing an increasing 
71. Hamada Giichiro¯, O¯ta Nanpo (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Ko¯bunkan, 1963), pp. 
152–74.
72. Hashimoto, Edo bakufu shiken seidoshi no kenkyu¯, pp. 145–46.
73. Ibid., pp. 140–50.
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acceptance of intellectual skills as a core factor to be considered in ap-
pointment. It was a powerful public symbol of the state’s promotion of an 
increase in the value of scholarship as cultural capital.
This increasing social and political value of scholarship, symbolized 
through the academy’s Confucian examinations, extended to other areas of 
knowledge promoted by the Sho¯heizaka scholars. Shibano’s emphasis on 
the development of specialization in education, training, and bureaucracy—
especially including practical military, accounting, and civil administration 
skills—together with the attention of the Koga family to the development 
of European expansion all pointed toward modern trends that would be-
come more pronounced in the nineteenth century, particularly in relation to 
engagement with the technologies and sociologies of Western imperialism. 
Sho¯heizaka Academy scholars paid very early attention to this area.
Internationalization
The nineteenth century is generally acknowledged as the age of global 
empire. Through the early modern period, the world economy had become 
increasingly integrated across regions. This rapidly expanded the fl ow of 
information both quantitatively and qualitatively. Tokugawa Japan, espe-
cially in the fi elds of intellectual knowledge and intelligence, was in no way 
“isolated” from these developments.74 As pointed out in previous research, 
throughout the Tokugawa period private intellectuals and doctors showed 
great enthusiasm for foreign culture and technology, including those from 
the West.75 Sometimes overlooked in the historical literature, however, is 
the great care of the Tokugawa state from the beginning of the shogunate to 
acquire foreign intelligence. The most systematized access to foreign intel-
ligence was through the Dutch. As Matsukata Fuyuko’s work has demon-
strated, this was achieved particularly through the institutionalized system 
of the fu¯setsugaki.76 The acquisition of foreign intelligence was increas-
ingly actively sought and systematically institutionalized through the late 
eighteenth into the nineteenth century, leading ultimately to the establish-
ment of the Bansho Shirabesho (Barbarian Documents Research Institute) 
in 1856 (renamed Kaiseijo in 1863). The Bansho Shirabesho is famous as 
74. On the idea of alleged “isolation” in the Tokugawa period, see Ronald P. Toby, “Sa-
koku” to iu gaiko¯ (Tokyo: Sho¯gakkan, 2008), and Ronald P. Toby, State and Diplomacy in 
Early Modern Japan: Asia in the Development of the Tokugawa Bakufu (Princeton: Prince-
ton University Press, 1984).
75. See Ivo Smits and Leonard Blusse, eds., Bridging the Divide: 400 Years, the 
Netherlands- Japan (Leiden: Hotei Publishing, 2000); Margarita Winkel, “Discovering Dif-
ferent Dimensions: Explorations of Culture and History in Early Modern Japan” (Ph.D. diss., 
Leiden University, 2004).
76. Matsukata Fuyuko, Oranda fu¯setsugaki to kinsei Nihon (Tokyo: To¯kyo¯ Daigaku 
Shuppankai, 2007).
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the main vehicle for late Tokugawa intelligence on Western politics and 
technology and as the breeding ground for a large number of the infl uential 
political thinkers of the early Meiji period.77 Often ignored is the fact that 
the intellectual and institutional roots of these organizations are found in 
the late eighteenth-century reform of the Sho¯heizaka Academy itself and 
thus in the work of Neo-Confucian political advisors of the eighteenth 
century.
Ten years before the Kansei period, while still an independent scholar 
studying in the Kansai in 1778, Koga Seiri wrote an infl uential treatise 
warning of possible encroachment on Japan’s autonomy by foreign (par-
ticularly Russian) imperial ambitions and advising the shogunate what ac-
tion it should take to prevent it. Kyokuron jiji fu¯ji (A secret memorial on 
the urgency of current affairs) seems to have been the fi rst political treatise 
to systematically address the Western threat issue.78 Interestingly, it pre-
dates the works usually cited on this issue such as Hayashi Shihei’s Sangoku 
tsu¯ran zusetu (1786) and Kaikoku heidan (1787), and the Mito scholar Fu-
jita Yu¯koku’s Seimeiron (1791).79 Koga’s thesis, like Hayashi Shihei’s later 
works, was advice on how to hold back foreign incursions. The manner 
through which Koga advised the shogunate to do that, however, is striking 
for its reformist, engaging, and one might even say daring nature. Koga 
recommended a diplomatically and militarily expansive policy including 
engagement with Western technology, arguing that the shogunate should 
“employ the barbarians to assault the barbarians.”80 This was his recom-
mended approach to the problem of potential Western threat as early as the 
end of the eighteenth century. His third son and later head of the Sho¯heizaka 
Academy, Koga To¯an (1788–1847), continued this work, becoming a ma-
jor writer on coastal defense alongside his Confucian duties.81 To¯an’s son, 
77. Important Meiji intellectuals and leaders with Bansho Shirabesho pedigrees included 
Nakamura Masanao, Nishi Amane, Tsuda Mamichi, Kato¯ Hiroyuki, Mitsukuri Shu¯hei, Sugi 
Ko¯ji, Mitsukuri Rinsho¯, Sho¯da Heigoro¯, Numa Morikazu, and Fukuchi Genichiro¯.
78. I follow Mikiso Hane’s translation of this title as it appears in his translation of 
Maruyama, Studies in the Intellectual History of Tokugawa Japan, p. 344.
79. Brett Walker, for instance, uses Hayashi Shihei’s 1787 work as the primary refer-
ence for the emergence these kinds of ideas (Brett L. Walker, The Conquest of Ainu Lands: 
Ecology and Culture in Japanese Expansion, 1590–1800 [Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 2001], pp. 164, 169, 264 [note 33]), as does Robert Hellyer (Robert I. Hellyer, Defi ning 
Engagement: Japan and Global Contexts, 1640–1868 [Cambridge, Mass: Harvard Univer-
sity Asia Center, 2009], p. 102).
80. Koga Seiri, Kyokuron jiji fu¯ji (1778), in Takimoto Sei’ichi, ed., Nihon keizai so¯sho, 
Vol. 17 (Tokyo: Nihon Keizai So¯sho Kanko¯kai, 1917), p. 185. This phrase appears in Han shu, 
in Ban and Dingyi, Xin Jiao Ben Han Shu Bing Fu Bian Er Zhong, p. 2281, and Hou Han shu, 
in Fan, Xin Jiao Ben Hou Han Shu Bing Fu Bian Shi San Zhong, p. 1576.
81. Koga To¯an’s Kaibo¯ okusoku (1839) is usually cited as one of the major Tokugawa-era 
works on coastal defense.
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Koga Kin’ichiro¯ (1816–84), did likewise and became an expert in the Dutch 
language and Western learning in general, as well as being a Confucian 
professor at the Sho¯heizaka Academy and the fi rst director of the Bansho 
Shirabesho.
In his 1778 treatise on the Western threat, Koga Seiri argued that the 
most urgent reform was to “open the channels of communication.”82 As 
touched on earlier, this is also one of the most important elements of his 
advice for general reform of the shogunate bureaucracy contained in his 
Ju¯jikai.83 In both works, he refers primarily to communication between dif-
ferent levels of government and society in Japan. In Ju¯jikai it is clear that 
he calls for a dynamic opening in the capacity of the upper levels to hear 
the advice of those lower in the hierarchy. In Kyokuron jiji fu¯ji, Koga uses 
this  “orthodoxy” to go further than he does in Ju¯jikai by suggesting the 
opening of the channels of communication not only as a tool of interagency 
governance but also to imply that the shogunate should seek intelligence 
and information from outside. The practical implications of this he makes 
clear in recommending the development of cannon technology and naval 
 forces.84 The textual basis for this “opening the channels of communica-
tion” in Kyokuron jiji fu¯ji is none other than a citation from Cheng Yi, the 
Song philosopher who, together with his brother Cheng Hao and Zhu Xi 
himself, is regarded as one of three founders of the Zhu Xi school of Neo-
Confucianism.85
Possibly the most dynamic element of the treatise is not simply this 
advice to employ naval technologies in response to similar developments in 
the West but the aggressiveness and thoroughness with which Koga recom-
mended a policy of territorial expansion in the north. Interest in territorial 
expansion to the north of Japan into the areas now known as Hokkaido, the 
Kuriles, and Sakhalin was a point in the writing of contemporary fi gures 
like Miura Baien.86 Koga’s recommendation of this policy is remarkable 
in linking this to institutional reform by arguing for the enfeoffment of 
Japanese lords in this area, and both learning from and utilizing directly 
barbarians in these areas for military purposes.87 This clear recommenda-
tion to engage foreign technologies and people in organizing for military 
defense as well as expansion of Japan is one striking element of the treatise 
82. Koga, Kyokuron jiji fu¯ji, pp. 170–72.
83. Koga, Ju¯jikai, p. 157.
84. Koga, Kyokuji jiji fu¯ji, pp. 174–77.
85. Ibid., p. 172. The phrase 開言路 kai yanlu (kai genro; genro o hiraki) (open the 
channels of communication) is a direct quote contained in Zhu Xi, Zhuzi Yu Lei (Beijing: 
Zhonghua Shu Ju, 1985), p. 2449. The phrase yanlu is used six times by Zhu Xi in this text 
and also in his commentary on Confucius Analects (Zhu Xi, Si Shu Zhang Ju Ji Zhu [Beijing: 
Zhonghua Shu Ju, 1983), p. 290).
86. See Walker, Conquest of Ainu Lands.
87. Koga, Kyokuron jiji fu¯ji, pp. 183–84.
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that goes beyond other writers’ ideas of forward defense through occupation 
of “unused” lands.88
The model at this time for Koga’s expansive vision of empire appears 
to have been not so much the West but Qing China. Recent publications on 
the history of the Manchu Empire have pointed out its success until quite 
late in its program of territorial expansion—or what some have labeled 
“imperialism.”89 In his advice on how to deal with the Western threat in the 
north by “employing the barbarians to assault the barbarians,” Koga refers 
to this approach as “the Chinese model.”90 He borrows the “employing the 
barbarians to assault the barbarians” phrase from the Han shu from a period 
in Chinese history often compared to the Qing in terms of the extent of 
expansionist activity. Indeed, contemporaneously, the Manchu Qing empire 
was “defending” China exactly through this kind of dynamic territorial ex-
pansion, bringing it into initially victorious military confl ict with Russia—
the very same foreign threat that Koga was worried about.91
The infl uence of not only classical, Han, Song, and Ming but also of 
reasonably contemporary Qing political thinking and writing in the ideas of 
Koga is interesting when considering the global manner in which he thought 
about the political issues facing the shogunate. While on the one hand Ko-
ga’s openness to Western technologies and recommended policy of com-
peting externally with the Western powers militarily is strikingly different 
from the image that is usually presented of orthodox Neo- Confucians, it is 
also interesting to note that many infl uences on this approach to political 
advice appear to come from an at-this-time still aggressive and expansive 
(as well as Neo-Confucian) Qing China.92 Unlike in the early nineteenth-
century Mito school writing, where China is perceived as weak, in this 
88. Koga uses the term “unused” (buyo¯) in Kyokuron jiji fu¯ji, p. 185. The implication 
that the lack of cultivation of land in the same manner as that practiced by the imperialist 
power renders the indigenous peoples’ land rights null and void was also contemporaneously 
a classic justifi cation of land appropriation in Western imperialism. The legal construction of 
terra nullius in the case of the British occupation of Australia, which occurred ten years after 
the writing of Kyokuron jiji fu¯ji, is a classic example.
89. Mark C. Elliott, The Manchu Way: The Eight Banners and Ethnic Identity in Late 
Imperial China (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001); Peter C. Perdue, China Marches 
West: The Qing Conquest of Central Eurasia (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard 
University Press, 2005). The use of the word “imperialism” and the comparison with con-
temporary Western imperialism can be found in Kirk W. Larsen, Tradition, Treaties, and 
Trade: Qing Imperialism and Chosoˇn Korea, 1850–1910 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Asia Center, 2008), pp. 1–10.
90. Koga, Kyokuron jiji fu¯ji, p. 185.
91. Perdue, China Marches West, p. 138.
92. See Makabe’s chapters on the effect of Qing Confucian commentaries on the devel-
opment of Koga Seiri’s Confucianism, and the effect of Qing writings on both Koga Seiri’s 
and Koga To¯an’s approach to foreign relations (Makabe, Tokugawa ko¯ki no gakumon to seiji, 
pp. 232–81). See also Takehiko Okada’s comments on late Tokugawa Neo-Confucians iden-
tifying themselves (his italics) with late-Ming and early-Qing Confucians (in Peter Nosco, 
50 Journal of Japanese Studies 38:1 (2012)
earlier  period writers like Koga associate both Qing China and its Neo-
Confucian tradition with global power.
The way the infl uence of late imperial China played out in the writings 
and advice of the Sho¯heizaka Academy scholars was in large part deter-
mined by their own critical and complex approach to Chinese government 
and scholarship. Shibano Ritsuzan in his Jo¯sho, for example, praised Japa-
nese scholars for their translations of Tang political treatises and the Ming 
legal codes as a great contribution to just government on one page and then 
condemned mindless copying of Chinese ways on the next.93 Sho¯heizaka 
Academy scholars clearly favored terminology and ideas from Han texts, 
like those of Ban Gu, regarded as having marked the change in examination 
curricula from Ming to Qing. At the same time, they used Qing-era criti-
cism of evidential learning to condemn the Sorai-ist scholarship in Japan 
which demanded a return to sole reliance on Han and pre-Han texts.
In other words, scholars such as Shibano, Koga, and Bito¯ Jishu¯ were in 
no sense following anyone else’s predetermined state or other orthodoxy. 
They constructed their stance from a mix of positions picked out of the late 
imperial polemics on Confucian literary and political theory. They were 
happy to recommend Qing-favored Han-dynasty political treatises and his-
tories alongside Ming commentaries on Song Neo-Confucian theory that 
had been recommended by Korean envoys.94 Their tastes were diverse, 
transnational, and transdynastic but clearly infl uenced primarily by late im-
perial China. This is the main point to emphasize in contrast with the image 
of Japanese Neo-Confucianism that often holds sway in the secondary lit-
erature. Sho¯heizaka Academy Confucianism, in terms of both political and 
literary theory, was not primarily Song. It was not stuck in a static discourse 
set in the twelfth century but was linked directly into the dynamic discourse 
on politics of the previous two centuries. The immediate and overwhelming 
infl uences were Ming and Qing, with an occasional dash of Chosoˇn. Much 
of that infl uence was delivered through texts written since 1600 and thereby 
imported into and acting upon Japan through the Tokugawa period. This 
also points to the transnational character of the development as well as the 
content of Sho¯heizaka Academy political thought.
Conclusion
In contrast to most Tokugawa Confucians, the Three Kansei Professors, 
and those who followed them into leadership positions in the Sho¯heizaka 
ed., Confucianism and Tokugawa Culture [Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984], 
p. 229).
93. Shibano, Ritsuzan jo¯sho, pp. 135–36. Shibano praises Japanese scholars’ transla-
tions of the Tang Zhenguan zhengyao and the Ming Daminglü.
94. See the discussion on Qiu Jun’s (1421–95) Daxue yanyi (Jp. Daigaku engi) in Shi-
bano, Ritsuzan jo¯sho, p. 137.
 Paramore: The Nationalization of Confucianism 51
Academy, enjoyed a level of institutionalized integration into the machinery 
of government that allowed them to infl uence structural political reform 
to an unprecedented extent. Their reformist vision of bureaucracy had the 
most comprehensive impact on the machinery of shogunate governance. 
While accepting the inherent feudal nature of shogunal government, they 
argued cogently for a more professional approach to the fl ow of informa-
tion in government, and through the elevation of the Sho¯heizaka Academy 
effected a more important role for knowledge (practical as well as ethical) 
and advice in government. Through state institutionalization of the acad-
emy, and the installation of an examination system affecting bureaucratic 
appointment, they were able to institutionalize a form of intellectual indoc-
trination in their approaches to knowledge and government that outlasted 
their own tenures within the shogunate.
Critically, the approach to knowledge institutionalized at this time, and 
represented in texts such as Ritsuzan jo¯sho and the Sho¯heishi, was two 
pronged. One approach was the introduction of a standardized, shared cur-
riculum of ethical education carried out through evidential argument. This 
was based on a standardized approach to Neo-Confucian learning infl uenced 
by Song, Ming, and Qing commentators and provided the “orthodoxy” of-
ten mentioned in relation to the Kansei reforms. As Shibano Ritsuzan made 
abundantly clear, however, this shared corpus of a standardized body of basic 
ethical knowledge was designed to create a shared ethic, an underlying sense 
of solidarity among the bureaucratic strata, over which would be lain the 
development of a range of each bureaucrat’s specialist areas of knowledge. 
This emphasis on developing specialist knowledge among the members of 
the bureaucratic strata, in fi elds as diverse as traditional fi ghting techniques 
and the reading of Dutch texts, was the other important strand of the edu-
cational doctrine of the reforms often missed in previous research. Special-
ist knowledge, and thereby specialization, was something emphasized by 
Shibano in his initial memorial to the shogunate, taken up in the organiza-
tion of the academy, strengthened by its evidential approach to knowledge, 
and best exemplifi ed by the championing of non-Confucian knowledge by 
Koga Seiri’s descendants in the Sho¯heizaka and Bansho academies.
In this sense, both the “bureaucracy” and the “knowledge” sought by 
the reformers, although heavily infl uenced by Chinese ideas, were in no way 
attempts to recreate either Chinese bureaucratism or the construction of the 
kind of Neo-Confucian orthodoxy associated with, for instance, the Ming 
dynasty’s examination system. In fact, Shibano, Koga, and Bito¯ shared the 
open hostility of critical Qing commentators to the idea of a form of selec-
tion based purely on literary orthodoxy. Their original vision was a mix 
of feudal and bureaucratic, military and literary, practical and ethical ap-
proaches to the construction of good governance. This vision, however, had 
a transnational pedigree. It arose from, and can be seen as part of, a trans–
East Asian discourse on the role of knowledge in government.
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This late Tokugawa experience is particularly interesting when consid-
ering how feudal and bureaucratic systems of government interact, espe-
cially in terms of the issue of later modernization.95 Chinese and Korean 
bureaucratism has been seen by some scholars as a roadblock to moderniza-
tion because of the focus of the examination systems on a closed canonical 
corpus of old indigenous knowledge. It has been argued that in feudalism, 
the fact that hereditary status was not linked to knowledge systems per-
haps made feudal societies more fl exible in picking up new constellations 
of outside knowledge. But in late Tokugawa Japan, an increase in the role of 
bureaucratic elements of government, albeit within the feudal system, was 
clearly designed to effect more engagement by the state with specialized 
knowledge and the systematic processing of knowledge in a more compart-
mentalized, specialized manner. In other words, bureaucratization appears 
to have aided the development of more “modern” forms of information and 
knowledge management, government organization, and appointment. This 
topic is worthy of deeper investigation through further research on these late 
Tokugawa reforms and the operation of the later Sho¯heizaka Academy.96
The role of orthodoxy is another element of this late Tokugawa experi-
ence for further consideration. Most theoretical writing on orthodoxy ap-
proaches the phenomenon in terms of its history in Western theology. Much 
writing on the role of orthodoxy in the history of China has also concen-
trated on the religious connotations of state Confucian orthodoxy.97 These 
religious connotations are probably less relevant to Japan, given Japanese 
society’s historically comparative disinterest in the ritual side of Confucian-
ism.98 However, historians of China have also emphasized the political side 
of orthodoxy. Benjamin Elman, for instance, has described state-sanctioned 
Confucian orthodoxy in late imperial China in terms of “a carefully con-
structed Confucian ‘disguise’ worn by an autocratic but not yet totalitarian 
state.”99 He emphasized a top-down vision where orthodoxy is created by 
those on high to control those below. This is probably the kind of vision of 
Confucian orthodoxy assumed by most writers on Japan when they mention 
the Kansei Prohibition of Heterodoxy. The roots of the Kansei orthodoxy, 
95. See recent infl uential works in this fi eld such as Woodside, Lost Modernities, and 
Zhang and Sonoda, “Ho¯ken” “gunken” saiko¯.
96. For such research, Hashimoto Akihito, ed., Sho¯heizaka Gakumonjo nikki (Tokyo: 
Shibunkai, 1998–2006), is an important resource.
97. Liu, Orthodoxy in Late Imperial China, pp. 1–24.
98. Kurozumi, Fukusu¯sei no Nihon shiso¯, pp. 209–11. Note that I write comparative dis-
interest. As the research of James McMullen into the sekiten ritual has shown, some Japanese 
certainly were interested in Confucian ritual. I. J. McMullen, “The Worship of Confucius in 
Ancient Japan,” in Peter Francis Kornicki and James Mullen, eds., Religion in Japan: Arrows 
to Heaven and Earth (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 39–77.
99. Elman and Woodside, eds., Education and Society in Late Imperial China, p. 112.
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however, were not autocratic or totalitarian. The introduction of a standard-
ized practical approach to Confucian knowledge (the Sho¯heizaka “ortho-
doxy”) was conducted by Confucians who came from independent schools 
in Osaka and the regional han, and who had themselves little hereditary 
standing. It was their way to use their often peripheral Confucian political 
ideas to infl uence the hereditary feudal government. In other words, the cre-
ation of “orthodoxy” was for them a step in creating an institutional struc-
ture whereby thinking people of little hereditary status, and often from the 
periphery of Japan, could affect the central government: bottom up rather 
than top down.
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